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Abstract
Significant valuable information can be
determined by observing attackers in action. These
observations provide significant insight into the
attacker’s TTPs and motivations. It is challenging to
continue observations when attackers breach
operational networks. This paper describes a
deception network methodology that redirects traffic
from the compromised Operational Network (O-Net)
to an identically configured Deception Network (DNet) minimizing any further compromise of
operational data and assets, while also allowing the
tactics, techniques, and procedures of the attacker to
be studied. To keep the adversary oblivious to the
transfer from the O-Net to the D-Net, we employ a
sophisticated and unique packet rewriting technique
using Software Defined Networking (SDN)
technology that builds on two other strategies. This
paper discusses the foundational strategies and
introduces a new strategy that improves behavior for
our described scenarios. We then provide some
preliminary test results and suggest topics for further
research.

1. Introduction
1.1. Background
An adversary who conducts Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT) cyber attacks is often a nation state or
an organization backed by significant resources and
with purposes beyond monetary gain (e.g. data theft,
establishing long-term presence, etc.). As such, their
attacks are targeted and very sophisticated. They are
determined to penetrate the target’s well-protected
networks and can maintain an undetected presence in
the network for a long period of time [1]. In addition,
they are likely to come back in, using alternate attack
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vectors, even if some (or all) of their previous
activities are discovered and mitigated.
They frequently follow the Cyber Kill Chain
Methodology [2]; conducting an extensive survey of
their target organization and developing malware or
attack methodologies customized for the target’s
environment before they start their attacks. Then the
adversary uses spear phishing, watering holes, supply
chain attacks, insiders, and/or other techniques to
deliver their payload and build a beachhead inside the
target’s network. When successful, a malicious
backdoor program can be installed on one of the
compromised devices in the network to build a
remote operation environment connected to their
external C2 (Command and Control) server. The
adversary is then able to conduct reconnaissance on
the compromised network to find additional targets
and/or discover where sensitive information is stored,
often moving laterally within the target environment
to reach more strategic positions. During such time,
the adversary generally takes steps to avoid detection
and uses legitimate tools and commands as much as
possible so that it is difficult to discern the
adversary’s activities from legitimate ones.
Depending on the overall objective, they might
exfiltrate sensitive data and take actions to cover their
tracks, leave false flags and indicators, or maintain
their stealthy existence within the target network.
Many cybersecurity textbooks and industry bestpractices dictate that when a compromised PC is
discovered, it should be disconnected or quarantined
from the network to prevent further damage.
However, when dealing with APT attacks, this
procedure is not always the best approach, as it often
results in a loss of valuable information about the
attack and the adversary. Even if you identify and
stop the intrusion once, the adversary could learn
from their failure and be very likely to come back
again using more sophisticated tools and techniques
which may be more challenging to detect. After
detecting a suspected APT attack in progress, it can
be used as an opportunity to apply cyber deception [3,
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Figure 1. Allow the adversary uninterrupted remote-control of the compromised PC from the C2 server
while transferring the network activities of the compromised PC from the O-Net to the D-Net
4] to obtain intelligence on the adversary, identify
their TTPs, understand their purposes and intentions,
and potentially, to keep them complacent with their
current TTPs and delay the development and use of
more sophisticated tools and tactics.

1.2. Challenges
Deploying cyber deception (vs. immediately
shutting down an intrusion and patching the system),
however, is a potentially dangerous reaction as we
are allowing the adversary to continue the attack. In
addition, the Cyber Deception campaign needs to be
conducted covertly so that the adversary does not
notice what is going on and alter behavior. When
operating a Deception Network, it is important to
both contain and observe the attack in real time and
do so safely and covertly. More specifically, we need
to accomplish the followings:
1)

2)

3)

Switch
communications
between
the
compromised host(s) and endpoints on the
Operational Network to corresponding
endpoints on the Deception Network without
any adverse side effects.
Maintain
the
session
between
the
compromised host(s) and the C2 server out on
the Internet through the process described in
(1) above.
Ensure that these defensive operations do not
provide the adversary with observable effects
that could alert them to the cyber deceptive
activities.

These are the challenges that this article and our
technical solution address.

1.3. Core Concept

The most important objective of all is that the
adversary does not notice that we are conducting a
cyber deception operation. To achieve this, we
deceive the adversary into believing they are
maintaining control of the compromised host on the
Operational Network (O-Net) from their command
and control (C2) server. In addition, it should also
appear to the adversary that they are communicating
with the other network nodes (PCs and servers) on
the O-Net, through the compromised host, without
any observable differences in behavior during the
changeover to the Deception Network (D-Net). This
deception effect is accomplished by ensuring the DNet is configured nearly identically to the O-Net.
(Figure 1). Once the adversary resides within the DNet, we can monitor all activity in a safe environment,
allowing normal operations to continue on the O-Net.
To achieve this effect, we employ Software Defined
Networking (SDN) technologies (See Sec. 2 for
details). Each O-Net subnet and the corresponding DNet subnet are connected through two OpenFlow
switches as shown in Figure 1. We give the D-Net the
same network configuration and each endpoint (e.g.
workstations, servers, and routers) uses the same IP
addresses, name, and roles/functions as the
corresponding endpoint on the O-Net. The primary
differences between the O-Net and the D-Net are (1)
the MAC addresses of endpoints and, (2) there is
only non-sensitive or fake information on the D-Net.
Information accessed or stolen from the D-Net does
not impact operations and may be selected or created
so as to deliberately misinform the adversary.
Whenever a compromise is detected on the O-Net,
we start rewriting the packet information flowing
between the compromised host and other endpoints
on the O-Net, resulting in each flow being directed
into the D-Net. As we do not know in advance which
host may become compromised, it is necessary to
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rewrite packets dynamically. For that purpose, we
picked Software Defined Networking (SDN)
technology, specifically OpenFlow-enabled switches
and a corresponding OpenFlow controller (Ryu).
Flow tables of OpenFlow are used extensively to
match and process packets to enable necessary packet
rewriting.
When rewriting packets using flow tables to deceive
the adversary, we must consider a few objectives.
Communications between the compromised hosts and
the endpoints on the O-Net need to be switched to
ones the corresponding D-Net hosts without any
noticeable effect. In addition, communication
between the compromised host and the C2 server
outside of the target’s organization needs to continue
uninterrupted. With the naive “match packet IP
address, then rewrite its MAC address” (strategy #1),
you can transfer UDP packets from the O-Net to the
D-Net, but TCP communication cannot be
established as the ARP information on the endpoint
on D-Net does not get updated. Since TCP
communication fails to establish, strategy #1 is not an
acceptable strategy.
With “match packet MAC address and ARP packets,
then rewrite its MAC information” (strategy #2), this
enables TCP communication within the O-Net subnet
and the D-Net subnet where the compromised host
resides. However, it cannot sustain communications
between the compromised host and both the C2
server and the other D-Net subnets at the same time.
This is because the packets to the C2 server and the
packets to the other D-Net subnets require them to be
sent through the different routers respectively.
To fully achieve our goals, strategy #3, which
employs both strategy #2 and the new “match packet
network IP address, then switch port accordingly”, is
utilized. This allows for TCP communications
between the compromised host and the O-Net to be
transferred to the D-Net without noticeable effects
and allows for TCP communications between the
compromised host and the C2 server to continue
uninterrupted. Table 1 summarizes the three
strategies.

1.4. Structure of this paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides a brief introduction to SDN and
OpenFlow. Section 3 describes work related to this
research. Section 4 describes the architecture and
implementation of the proposed deception technique.
Section 5 describes evaluation results of the proposed
technique. Section 6 concludes the paper and
provides some avenues for future research.

Table 1 . Packet rewriting strategies
Strategy
Description
Comments
#1
match packet IP
Naive, works only
address, then
for UDP packets
rewrite its MAC
address
#2
match packet
Works for TCP
MAC address
within the subnets,
and ARP
but not for comm.
packets, then
with both the C2
rewrite its MAC servers and other Dinformation
Net subnets at the
same time
#3
strategy #2 +
This solution works
match packet
for all internal and
network IP
external
address, then
communications
switch port
accordingly

2. SDN and OpenFlow
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an
architecture that dynamically controls the network
with software. OpenFlow [5] is one of the SDN
implementations, and its standardization is advanced
by the Open Network Foundation (ONF). OpenFlow
has the following features:
1) Separation of control plane and data plane
There are two functions for switches: to
communicate with other switches to determine
how network traffic should be forwarded; and to
then actually forward (or drop) packets
accordingly. The former occurs in the control
plane, and the latter in the data plane. For legacy
switches, those two functions happen in the same
place, namely within the switch. For OpenFlow,
those two planes are separated with the control
plane activities being moved to an external
OpenFlow Controller, which dictates traffic
forwarding rules to the switch in the form of flow
table entries. The data plane remains on the
switch and utilizes the controller-provided flow
tables to make the necessary forwarding decisions.
2) Flexible packet processing
Flow tables enable flexible packet processing.
The OpenFlow Controller adds, removes, or
modifies entries in the flow tables of its
associated switches. These rules can not only
cause the switch to forward or drop packets, but
also result in packets that are rewritten on the fly
or sent to a specific set of output ports. The
rule(s) applied to a given packet are selected
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based on matching fields between the rule and
incoming packet.
In this research, we created an OpenFlow controller
using the Ryu [6] framework. In addition, we
implemented a REST API to configure the flow
tables using Northbound APIs of the OpenFlow
Controller. (Northbound APIs are APIs to control an
OpenFlow Controller from an application.) We used
the Open vSwitch [7] as our OpenFlow switch
implementation, although the techniques are not
specific to that particular switch and could be applied
to a variety of other OpenFlow enabled devices.

3. Related work
There have been several attempts to covertly
observe cyber attacks before. We describe four major
approaches and compare them with our approach:

3.1. Sandbox
A sandbox such as Cuckoo [8] is a type of malicious
software analysis system. It simulates physical
operating systems in a virtual environment. The
sandbox executes or opens potentially malicious
artifacts (ex. codes and documents) in an isolated
environment and observes the resulting behavior of
the system. This approach can be effective at
observing the types of activity applied in the
exploitation stage of the kill chain, but are less useful
if one wants to observe advanced post-compromise
activity such as lateral movement and practically no
use to understand adversary’s intentions. Sandboxes
do have limitations, which include anti-sandboxing
mechanisms in malware itself (e.g., timeouts before
malicious activity begins, detection of system
artifacts that are typically found in sandboxes, and
detection of human behavior or recent activity which
is often absent in sandboxes) [9]. Our focus is to
observe how a human adversary performs his/her
attack after a successful malware infection and has
established a beachhead.

3.2. Honeypot
A honeypot is a decoy computer system designed to
look like a legitimate system an adversary will want
to break into while, unbeknownst to the adversary,
they are being covertly observed [10]. A honeypot is
generally deployed on the perimeter of the
organization’s network such as an Internet facing
server. They can also be placed throughout an

organization’s network, but it requires the adversary
to be lured to the honeypot through the Operational
Network (O-Net), and it can be a dangerous and
high-risk process. We transfer the attack to the
Deception Network (D-Net), which is a type of highinteraction honeypot within the organization as soon
as a compromise on one of endpoints is detected.
This does not require luring the adversary through the
O-Net and the adversary cannot access the O-Net
once the attack is contained within the D-Net.

3.3. Moving Target Defense (MTD)
Vincent E. Urias et al. proposed the Moving Target
Defense (MTD), whose aim is to increase attack
difficulty [11] by dynamically changing the targeted
network. This method differs from our purpose of
observing attacks safely and covertly. Though they
prepare the Deception Network (D-Net) with the
same configuration as the Operational Network (ONet) to contain the attack, they create the O-Net in a
fully realized virtual environment. Our architecture
consists of an O-Net consisting of actual physical
PCs, servers and network equipment and the D-Net
built in a virtual environment. Although we usually
use a D-Net in a virtual environment, the D-Net can
be physical as well.

3.4. Deception on Operational Networks
Recent cyber deception technologies are interwoven
directly into the Operational Networks (O-Nets) for
detection, diversion, resource depletion, uncertainty,
and intelligence purposes.
Reconnaissance Deception System (RDS) was
proposed in [12] to delay or thwart malicious
network reconnaissance. This is done through
providing the adversary a different virtual network
view at the assignment of a new DHCP lease by
virtually blowing up a single subnet into a multitude
of virtual subnets with hosts on the original subnet
scattered randomly among them along with
honeypots. The network topology can appear
different for the adversary every time the new virtual
network view is provided. This is confusing, but not
stealthy nor fit for our intelligence purpose. From the
technical perspective, its deception happens within
the scope of a single subnet and does not involve
more sophisticated packet rewriting strategies like
strategy #3 in Table 1.
Shadow Networks [13, 14] is a solution that
leverages the advantages of both low- and highinteraction honeypots. It projects (connects through
virtual switches) many low-interaction honeypots
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onto the O-Net. When an attacker probes into one of
low-interaction honeypots, a high-interaction
honeypot can be swapped in to take its place. When a
connection is attempted from the one of the
honeypots to a physical computer, a host emulator
can step in to take the place of the physical computer.
In this system, SDN is used to prevent collisions
between the duplicated IP addresses. To realize this,
Shadow Networks changes the destination to another
one within the O-Net (likely within the same subnet)
through
relatively
straight-forward
packet
manipulations and does not involve more
sophisticated packet rewriting strategies like strategy
#3 in Table 1.

4. Architecture and Implementation
We propose a Cyber Deception Architecture
consisting of a network configuration and an attack
transferring mechanism to transfer network
communications from the O-Net to the D-Net, using
the OpenFlow technologies. In this section, we
describe its architecture, with a focus on how the
transfer mechanism is implemented by using
OpenFlow.

4.1. Network Configuration

extendable
to
any
combination
of
a
physical/virtual/hybrid
O-Net
and
a
physical/virtual/hybrid D-Net. To control the
operation, there is also a Deception Management
Network.
To avoid alerting the adversary that the attack has
been transferred from the O-Net to the D-Net, each
endpoint on the D-Net has the same IP address as the
corresponding endpoint on the O-Net.
The O-Net has an OpenFlow switch as an access
switch for each subnet. The O-Net connects to the
corresponding subnet on the D-Net through the
OpenFlow switch and the corresponding OpenFlow
switch on the D-Net. Initially, the flow tables of the
two OpenFlow switches are set to block any
communication between the O-Net and the D-net.

4.2. Attack Transfer Mechanism
The deception operation of the attack transfer is
performed by the Deception Controller on the
Deception Management Network, by controlling the
OpenFlow Controller, which, in turn, controls the
OpenFlow Switches. The Attack Transferring
Mechanism uses the steps shown in Figure 3 to
facilitate a safe and covert attack transfer. Each step
is described in detail in the following section.

Figure 3. Attack Transfer Mechanism
0)
Figure 2. O-Net, D-Net, and Deception
Management Network
Figure 2 shows an example network configuration
we use to illustrate our architecture in this paper. The
two primary components of our architecture are an
Operational Network (O-Net) and a Deception
Network (D-Net) configured to be identical to the ONet. For our research, we typically use a physical ONet and a virtual D-Net that uses a single physical
server. However, our proposed technique would be

1)

Detect a Compromise. [This step is out of
scope of this paper] As an example, the Log
Search Engine detects a compromise on the ONet through an adversary’s access of a decoy file.
The Log Search Engine then sends a
compromise alert to the Deception Controller.
Prepare D-Net. Upon receiving the compromise
alert, the Deception Controller creates and
executes a script to (Step 2) instruct the
hypervisor to turn off the shadow (corresponding
endpoint on the D-Net) of the compromised PC,
and (Step 3) instruct the OpenFlow Controller
using the REST API to set the flow tables to the
OpenFlow
Switches
to
transfer
the
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2)

3)

4)

communications of the compromised PC to the
D-Net.
Shutdown Shadow. When instructed by the
Deception Controller, the hypervisor turns off
the shadow of the compromised PC on the D-Net.
This step is necessary because the compromised
PC transferred to the D-Net, not its shadow,
interacts with other endpoints on the D-Net.
Create Flow Tables. When instructed by the
Deception Controller, the OpenFlow Controller
sets the flow tables customized for each
OpenFlow Switch to match, rewrite, and change
the output ports of, packets.
Manipulate Packets. The OpenFlow Switches
stores the flow tables provided by the OpenFlow
Controller and starts matching, rewriting, and

changing the
accordingly.

output

ports

of,

packets

After the completion of these steps, the OpenFlow
switches work in coordination to transfer the
communications between the compromised PC and
the O-Net to the ones between the compromised PC
and the D-Net while the session between the
compromised PC and the C2 server is maintained.
The following section describes the packet
manipulation by the flow tables used to achieve this.

4.3. Packet Manipulation by the Flow Tables
We implement our sophisticated and unique packet
rewriting strategy #3 (Table 1) using the flow tables.

Figure 4. Packet Manipulation by the Flow Tables
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As a reminder, strategy #3 is “match packet MAC
address and ARP packets, then rewrite its MAC
information” and “match packet network IP address,
then switch port accordingly” combined. There are
three separate packet manipulations in the strategy #3.
A) Match ARP packets, then rewrite their MAC
information and change output ports
B) Match packets by their MAC addresses, then
rewrite the packet MAC addresses and change
output ports
C) Match packets by their network IP addresses,
then switch output ports accordingly
As mentioned in the Introduction, manipulation (A)
is necessary. ARP packets need to be rewritten to
ensure that TCP communications between the
compromised PC and the endpoint on the D-Net are
established. This is essential as ARP is used to
associate the MAC address with the IP address.
When an endpoint X on the D-Net attempts to send a
packet to the IP address of the compromised PC, X
uses an ARP request packet to determine the MAC
address for the compromised PC’s IP address. The
ARP request packet reaches the compromised PC,
but the ARP response packet will be sent to the
endpoint on the O-Net corresponding to X. Therefore,
X will never find the MAC address of the
compromised PC, failing to communicate to the
compromised PC. When the ARP packets, including
the ARP response packets from the compromised PC,
are rewritten as in (A), X can determine the MAC
address of the compromised PC.
With manipulation (B) along with (A), packets
to/from the compromised PC are sent to/from the
endpoints on the D-Net, thus the communications of
the compromised PC are successfully transferred
from the O-Net to the D-Net.
However, to ensure that communications of the
compromised PC beyond the subnet of the O-Net and
the corresponding D-Net subnet work correctly,
manipulation (C) is necessary. Without (C), the
communication between the compromised PC and
the C2 server, hosted outside the network and the
communication between the compromised PC and
other subnets could not be maintained simultaneously.
This is due to the fact that the router for the
communication of the compromised PC to/from the
C2 server and the router for the communications of
the compromised PC to/from the endpoints on the
other subnets on the D-Net are different. With (C),
the packet is sent out from the appropriate port
depending on the network IP address of the packet.
Figure 4 shows in detail how the mechanism
(deception architecture) works in the following

subsections. At the top of figure 4 are the subnets
(Network-2 of the O-Net and D-Net), PC-21, PC-22,
PC-23, and PC-24 on the subnet Network-2 of the ONet. Router-1, and PC-11 on the subnet Network-1 of
the O-Net. PC-22 is the compromised PC. There is a
C2 server operated by the adversary somewhere on
the Internet. The OpenFlow Switch-21 is the access
switch of the subnet Network-2. An endpoint on the
D-Net has the same name as the corresponding
endpoint on the O-Net. (We use ’ in this paragraph as
a substitute for “shadow” to represent the D-Net
version of an O-Net endpoint.) Therefore, there are
PC-21’, PC-23’, and PC-24’ on subnet Network-2’ of
the D-Net. Router-1’, and PC-11’ on the subnet
Network-1’ of the D-Net. The OpenFlow Switch-22
bridges the subnet Network-2 and the subnet
Network-2’. PC-22’, the shadow of the compromised
PC-22, has already been removed by the Deception
Controller and the hypervisor before this transfer
process is initiated.
4.3.1 ARP from the compromised PC
To make the compromised PC-22 logically belong
to the D-Net, ARP request and ARP reply packets
from the compromised PC are rewritten. The
destination MAC address in the Ether header and the
destination MAC address (Target Hardware Address)
of the ARP are rewritten from the MAC address of
the endpoint on the O-Net to the MAC address of its
shadow (the corresponding endpoint) on the D-Net.
The output port for the packet is changed to the one
for the OpenFlow Switch-22.
4.3.2 ARP to the compromised PC
Corresponding to Section 4.3.1, we also need to
control the ARP packets sent from the D-Net's
endpoint as if the compromised PC is on the same
subnet. The source MAC address in the Ether header
and the source MAC address (Sender Hardware

Figure 5. Rewriting an ARP Reply from PC-21
(shadow) to the compromised PC-22
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Address) of the ARP (see Figure 5) addressed to the
compromised PC-22 from an endpoint on the D-Net
are rewritten to the MAC address of the
corresponding endpoint on the O-Net. The output
port for the packet is changed to the one for the
OpenFlow Switch-21.
4.3.3 Packet from the compromised PC
The ARP tables of the endpoints on the O-Net and
D-Net are bridged coherently through the activity
described in Section 4.3.1. To send a packet other
than ARP, the destination MAC address in the Ether
header of the packet is rewritten to the MAC address
of the shadow on the D-Net. The output port for the
packet is changed to the OpenFlow Switch-22. Since
the priority of the flow tables for this operation is
lower than the flow tables for rewriting the ARP
packet, this applies to packets other than ARP.
Broadcast packets from the compromised PC-22
must be sent to the endpoints on the D-Net instead of
those on the O-Net. To achieve this, we use the
OpenFlow Group function. Broadcast packets from
PC-22 are sent to the group that combines the
connection port of PC-22 and the output port of
OpenFlow Switch-22. With this configuration,
broadcast packets are sent only to the endpoints on
the D-Net.
4.3.4 Packet to the compromised PC
As discussed in Section 4.3.3, packets from the
endpoints on the D-Net PC need to be rewritten so
that the compromised PC appears to be on the same
subnet. The source MAC address in the Ether header
addressed to the compromised PC-22 from the
endpoint on the D-Net is rewritten to the MAC
address of the corresponding endpoint on the O-Net.
The output port for the packet is changed to the one
for OpenFlow Switch-21. In addition, we need to
forward broadcast packets from the endpoint on the
same subnet of the D-Net to the compromised PC-22.
By sending this packet to the group described in
Section 4.3.3, these broadcast packets reach only PC22 on the O-Net and no other endpoints on the O-Net.
4.3.5 Maintaining the connection with C2 server
To maintain the connection between the
compromised PC and the C2 server out on the
Internet, the packets going out to the C2 server (and
other endpoints outside of the corporate network)
need to be handled differently from the packets going
to the other subnets within the corporate network. For

this purpose, the destination MAC address of the
packet from the compromised PC-22 addressed to
another subnet within the corporate network is
rewritten to the MAC address of the Router-1
(shadow) on the D-Net and the output port is changed
to the one for OpenFlow Switch-22. The source
MAC address of Router-1 (shadow) in the Ether
header of the packets form another D-Net subnet is
rewritten to the MAC address of Router-1 of the ONet and the output port is changed to the one for
OpenFlow Switch-21.
No changes are required for the packets between
the compromised PC and the C2 server and all
communication between them continue uninterrupted
through Router-1.
5.

Evaluation

5.1. Strategies #1 and #2 Tests
We confirmed the network behaviors of strategies
#1 and #2 in Table 1. For strategy #1, we used a
simple setup of three PCs connected to an OpenFlow
switch in a virtualized environment. The TCP
communication attempts between the compromised
PC and the endpoint on the D-Net were not
successfully established due to the lack of ARP
packet rewriting.
For strategy #2, we used a smaller version of the
environment as described in Subsection 5.2.
Communications between the compromised PC and
the endpoints on the D-Net were observed to be
working properly. Even though communications
between the compromised PC and the C2 server out
on the Internet were maintained, the communications
to the endpoints on other subnets of the O-Net failed
to be transferred to the corresponding subnets of the
D-Net. Instead, the latter communication was sent to
the subnets of the O-Net. This is not a desirable result
and introduces additional risk to the O-Net.

5.2. Test Methodology
To test our solution (strategy #3), two servers were
connected by a switch. One server provides a
virtualized environment for the O-Net (including
OpenFlow Switches) and the C2 server on the
Internet, and another server provides a virtualized
environment for the D-Net (including OpenFlow
Switches) and the Deception Management Network.
Both the O-Net and the D-Net have six subnets and
31 endpoints as shown in Figure 6.
For purposes of evaluation, attacks were conducted
on the compromised PC from the C2 server. We
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16) ifconfig: Get network interface information
(MAC address, IP address)
17) arp: Get the ARP table
18) route: Get the routing table
19) netstat: Get connection information
20) net use: Get SMB remote connection
information
21) post/windows/recon/computer_browser_discove
ry: List neighbor computers

5.3. Evaluation result

Figure 6. Evaluation Environment
observed from the adversary’s point of view (i.e.
from the C2 server) to try to identify any differences
detected before and after the attack transfer from the
O-Net to the D-Net. In addition, we watched other
negative triggers (like session termination) during the
transfer.
We automated the following post-compromise
activities selected from common attacks and let the
sequence run on the compromised PC from the C2
server's console before and after the transfer. The
script consists primarily of network-related
commands.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)

sysinfo: Get system and user information
idletime: Get the time since user’s last operation
getpid: Get the process ID of the current attack
process
ps: List current processes
post/windows/gather/enum_services: Get names
and configuration info of services
getproxy: Get information about proxy
post/windows/gather/credentials/enum_cred_sto
re: Get credentials of IE
post/multi/gather/thunderbird_creds:
Get
credentials of Thunderbird
ls -lR C:\\Users\\: List the users
post/windows/gather/enum_ie: Get IE browser
history
post/windows/gather/dumplinks2: List files
recently used
post/windows/gather/enum_applications:
List
installed applications
net user / net localgroup: Get information about
local accounts, groups and administrators
net share: Get shared folder information
show_mount: List currently attached mounts

From the adversarial perspective (both on the
compromised host and on the C2 server) the
automated attack script in Section 5.2 produced
identical results before and after the transfer from the
O-Net to the D-Net. The session between the
compromised PC and the C2 server remained
uninterrupted during and after the transfer. In
addition, no negative triggers were observed. Figure
7 shows the shortened output of the script.
[*] ifconfig
Interface 12
============
Name
Hardware MAC
MTU
IPv4 Address
IPv4 Netmask
IPv6 Address
IPv6 Netmask

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter
00:50:56:a5:04:e7
1500
10.10.22.102
255.255.255.0
fe80::84f4:5832:cee4:1469
ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff::

[*] arp
ARP cache
=========
IP address
---------10.10.22.1
10.10.22.101
10.10.22.103
10.10.22.104
10.10.22.201
10.10.22.255
224.0.0.22
224.0.0.22
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
239.255.255.250
255.255.255.255

MAC address
----------00:50:56:a5:72:73
00:50:56:a5:61:6c
00:50:56:a5:20:29
00:50:56:a5:2c:a7
00:50:56:a5:0d:69
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
00:00:00:00:00:00
01:00:5e:00:00:16
01:00:5e:00:00:fc
00:00:00:00:00:00
01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff

Interface
--------12
12
12
12
12
12
1
12
12
1
12
12

~~~
[*] net use
[+] Net use list
Status
-----OK

Local
----D:
M:

Remote
-----\\sh201\share
\\file\share\topsecret

[*] post/windows/recon/computer_browser_discovery
[+] Found 4 systems.
....
[*] Netdiscovery Results
====================
TYPE
---0x11003
0x11003
0x31003
0x51003

IP
-10.10.22.102
10.10.22.104
10.10.22.103
10.10.22.101

COMPUTER NAME
------------KG201
YM201
KI201
UN201

VERSION
------6.1
6.3
6.3
6.1

COMMENT
-------

meterpreter >

Figure 7. Logs collected by adversary

6.

Conclusion
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Our objective is to contain and observe an APT-like
attack safely and covertly so that we can monitor
adversarial behavior in real time to understand their
TTPs, purposes, and intentions. To achieve this
objective, we propose creating and deploying a
Deception Network (D-Net) with the same network
topology and endpoints, using the same IP addresses
of the corresponding endpoints on the Operational
Network (O-Net). When we detect a compromise on
the O-Net, we transfer the communications between
the compromised PC and the O-Net endpoints to the
ones between the compromised PC and the D-Net
while keeping the communications between the
compromised PC and the C2 server intact. That is
achieved by using OpenFlow's flow tables for
matching and rewriting packets. We have confirmed
that we can contain the compromised PC without the
adversary observing any difference before and after
the cyber deception and that the session remained
intact during and after the transfer.
The focus of the paper, the attack transferring
mechanism through SDN is important but is still just
one piece of the whole Cyber Deception puzzle and it
needs to be incorporated into the entire cyber
deception operation. We have combined the
mechanism with carefully crafted honey tokens on ONet and intelligence gathering in D-Net so that as
soon as the attacker touches a honey token, it triggers
the attack-transferring mechanism automatically,
leading to endpoint and network intelligence
gathering on D-Net. We tested this system in cyber
war games and it worked seamlessly and successfully
deceived the red team for many hours until the game
ended.
For future research and analysis, we will continue
our empirical evaluations of the technology and work
to develop scientific and objective evaluation
methods, to continue to refine the technology. For
technology refinement, we plan to implement and
evaluate our cyber deception architecture for IPv6
using our already implemented Northbound API for
matching and rewriting the Neighbor Discovery
Protocol (NDP) of IPv6, the ARP equivalent of IPv4.
Potential flaws revealing the deception include
network latency changes and server content
continuity before and after the switch from the O-Net
to the D-Net. In follow-on research, we will test
network latency changes in various real and
virtualized configurations. In more and more
virtualized operational networks, however, network
latency may not provide significant clues for the
adversary to determine if he or she is in a deceptive
environment or not. Server content continuity is an
important consideration in balancing maintenance
and other costs, and realism of the deceptive

environment and would require innovative solutions,
which is a focus on our follow-on research.
7.
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